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RECOVERY FOR INJURIES SUFFERED
ON AMUSEMENT DEVICES
BY DONALD E. BLANCHARD*
This note was awarded the 1962 Omar E. Garwood Memorial
Prize of $100 in a competition sponsored by the Association of
Colorado Claimants' Attorneys.
America's rapidly expanding society is providing continually
lengthened hours of leisure for its citizens. Coupled with this availability of free time is the citizens' desire to seek entertaining ways
of spending it. America's ingenuity in all activities is evidenced by
the rapidly growing amusement and sports industry which each year
takes in tremendous sums in dollar volume.
It is to be expected that as more persons participate in amusement and pleasure activities, more of them will suffer injuries which
will be compensable at law. Liability for injuries suffered in places
of public amusement has long been established in America.' However, this paper will not attempt to survey such a general area of
the law; discussion will be restricted in the main to cases arising
out of injuries suffered on amusement devices such as roller coasters, merry-go-rounds, and the like. Reference will be made to other
areas in the amusement field where comparison is thought to be
valuable.
I. BASIS OF LIABILITY
Needless to say liability will result from an intentional tort
committed by the owner or operator of an amusement device as
well as by anyone else. 2 In such cases it may well be that the plaintiff in bringing an action need not show damages; 3 this is in line
with the historical development of the law of intentional torts.
When the owner of an amusement device is sought to be held
liable for the intentional torts of his servant, such liability of course
flows from the principles of the master-servant relationship and
the doctrine of respondeat superior once it is established that the
servant was acting in the scope of his employment. 4 If during the
scope of his employment the servant intentionally injures a patron,
the master may well be held liable. Thus, if employees are stationed
in or near a place of amusement to prevent malicious damage done
by patrons, the master5 will be liable for an assault by these persons
on an innocent patron.
Most of the situations involving intentional torts by servants
occur with regard to the servants' attempts to maintain order. Frequently, the servant involved is a special police officer or a regular
police officer on special duty. If he is hired by the operator of the
* Student, University of Denver College of Low.
1 Most of the early cases involve injuries sustained in an exhibition hall or theater; see, for
example, Currier v. Boston Music Hall Ass'n, 135 Mass. 414 (1883). However, recovery was allowed
for injury suffered in collapse of grandstand at a bicycle race in Fox v. Buffalo Park, 47 N.Y.Supp.
788, 57 N.E. 1109 (Ct. App. 1897); recovery was allowed for injury suffered because of faulty
construction of toboggan slide in Barrett v. Lake Ontario Beach Imp. Co., 174 N.Y. 310, 66 N.E. 968

(1902).

2 Restatement, Torts § 13 (1934).
3 Prosser, Torts 28 n.17 (1955).
4 See text, IV. Who Is Liable.
5 Servants placed in a tunnel to prevent vandalism by persons riding on ride were acting within
the scope of their employment when they mistakenly assaulted a person on the ride. Healey v.
Playland Amusements, 199 So. 682 (La. App. 1941).
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park or the operator of the device or ride there seems to be little
question that the master is liable for an intentional assault by the
officer-his employee.6
A question arises as to the status of these special officers when
it is difficult to tell whether their actions are designed to preserve
peace and order or constitute an arrest for the commission of a
crime. It seems that it is for the jury to decide, under all the evidence of the case, in which capacity the officer is acting at the time
of the incident. 7
Turning to the area of negligence, liability may be based either
on the specific negligence of the operator of the amusement device
or upon a general allegation of negligence with resort to the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur.
If the plaintiff bases his claim upon a specific act of negligence,
naturally that particular negligence must be proved; this requirement places upon the plaintiff the burden of showing the defendant's knowledge of the defect complained of.8 Knowledge on the
part of the defendant may be shown by actual or constructive
notice.9
In a case involving injury resulting from a fall when the plaintiff stepped on a board which broke under her weight, the court
acknowledged there was no actual notice of the defect but said
constructive notice was present because the condition had existed
(according to the testimony) for a long period of time; the de6 Alamo Downs, Inc. v. Briggs, 106 S.W.2d 733 (Tex. Civ. App. 1937); Hirst v. Fitchburg &
L. St. Ry., 196 Mass. 353, 82 N.E. 10 (1907).
7 Neallus v. Hutch'inson Amusement Co., 126 Me. 469, 139 AtI. 671 (1928).
8 Berberet v. Electric Park Amusement Co., 319 Mo. 275, 3 S.W.2d 1025 (1928). As to the duty
owed, the violation of which constitutes the negligence, see text, IV. Who Is Liable.
9 Junkermonn v. Tilyou Realty Co., 213 N.Y. 404, 108 N.E. 190 (1915).
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fendant's employees should have discovered the defect in time to
remedy it.

1°

In a case for injuries suffered by a bowler in a fall on a wet
runway, the court said the proprietor, to be liable, must have either
actual or constructive notice of the existence of the water on the
floor, and constructive notice is chargeable only where the defect
has existed for a sufficient length of time."'
The injury complained of in a case may be the result of intentional or careless conduct of third persons, and in such cases the
negligence of the defendant consists of a failure to provide reasonably safe premises for public use.'2 Most of such cases involve
action amusements such as skating. If the defendant or his employees are on duty at the place of amusement, they will be deemed
to have notice of the dangerous conduct of participants. 1 3 Also,
without presence of the defendant or his employees in viewing the
registered by participants will
dangerous conduct, actual complaint
14
place the defendant on notice.
If the amusement involves the bumping of others as part of
the game (such as on self driver "Dodgem" cars), recovery may
not be allowed for injuries alleged to have been received as a result
of being bumped. 15 However, the facts of a particular case may
warrant recovery against the proprietor of such a device where he
or his employees know of particularly dangerous conduct on the
part of some drivers. 16
Another point should be made with regard to the situation,
where the plaintiff's case is based on some specific act of negligence.
A judgment for the plaintiff was reversed in a recent case because
the instructions to the jury were at variance with the allegation
and the proof in the case. 17 The complaint was based on the fact
that the operator had speeded up the device and caused it to jerk
thereby injuring the plaintiff; the evidence tended to prove this
negligent operation. However, the instructions were worded to predicate liability on negligent maintenance of the device to prevent
injury. No proof had been offered on this, and the inclusion of such
instruction was reversible error.
II.

USE OF THE DOCTRINE OF RES IPSA LOQUITUR

Pleading acts of specific negligence such as negligent operation,
maintenance or construction or failure to inspect, and the offer of
proof on these allegations will not prevent the plaintiff from also
relying on the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur.'8 If the plaintiff offers
sufficient evidence of specific negligence to satisfy his burden of
10 Long v. Savin Rock Amusement Co., 141 Conn. 150, 104 A.2d 221 (1954).
In this case the
court pointed out that the greater the likelihood cf danger, the greater the amount of care which
is required. The board in question here was in a damp area; it was subject to continued wetting;
and it was unpainted. From these facts the jury could reasonably find that a reasonable inspection
would reveal the defect in question, and therefore constructive notice could be imputed to the
defendant.
11 Reiher v. Mandernack, 234 Wis. 568, 291 N.W. 758 (1940).
12 As to the duty owed, the violation of which constitutes the negligence, see text, IV. Who Is
Liable.
13 Thomas v. Studio Amusements, Inc., 50 Cal.App.2d 538, 123 P.2d 552 (Dist. Ct. App. 1942).
14 Murphy v. Winter Garden & Ice Co., 280 S.W. 444 (Mo. App. 1926).
15 Gardner v. G. Howard Mitchell, Inc., 107 N.J.L. 311, 153 AtI. 607 (Ct. Err. & App. 1931).
16 Connolly v. Palisades Realty & Amusement Co., 11 N.J. Misc. 841, 168 AtI. 419 (Sup. Ct. 1933).
In this case the court pointed out that a person takes the chance of injury through normal operation,
but he does not take the chance of conduct of others in violation of the rules and which is known
by the proprietor to endanger safety.
17 Bee's Old Reliable Shows, Inc. v. Maupin's Adm'x, 311 Ky. 837, 226 S.W.2d 23 (1950).
18 Harrison v. Southeastern Fair Ass'n, 104 Ga.App. 596, 122 S.E.2d 330 (1961).
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proof including that to withstand the defendant's rebuttal, naturally
the plaintiff need not rely on res ipsa loquitur to get to the jury.',
His case should in that situation go to the jury on specific negligence.
Confusion seems to arise in those cases where plaintiff pleads
some acts which could be classified as specific negligence, such as
negligent maintenance, and also attempts to rely on the doctrine of
res ipsa loquitur. In one case the plaintiff received a severe burn
on her hip which was allegedly inflicted when she was forced
against the side of a metal car on the device on which she was
riding. There was specific testimony as to the cause of the heat at
that point on the car-faulty guide wheels on the outside rubbed
against the car generating heat from the friction. The introduction
of much evidence did not remove
the plaintiff's right to use the
20
doctrine of res ipsa loquitur also.

In another case the defendant received a directed verdict in its
favor at the close of the plaintiff's case. The grounds were that the
plaintiff's evidence failed to prove any knowledge on the part of
the defendant of the defect complained of and therefore was insufficient to satisfy the plaintiff's burden of proof. The case was
reversed on appeal. 1 The court indicated that the plaintiff need
not plead the facts to establish res ipsa loquitur as long as the court
and opposing party are apprised of its applicability, and the elements necessarily
present to justify its use are adduced by the
2
plaintiff. '

The doctrine of res ipsa loquitur may be effectively used where
there are multiple defendants. 23 Frequently, the plaintiff will join
the lessee or concessionaire operating an amusement device as well
as the owner of the park or premises. In a New York case,'24 although
the independent contractor was not joined as a defendant, the suit
against the proprietor, state of New York, was allowed on the basis
of res ipsa loquitur even though the independent contractor operated the device. The court said, "It is not necessary ... that there
be but a single person in control of that" instrument causing the
damage.
It should be pointed out, however, that the doctrine of res ipsa
loquitur is no cure-all for a doubtful case. Two recent cases may be
examined to illustrate this in regard to two aspects-a case of possible mechanical failure and a case wherein the injury was due to
no mechanical defect.
In the first of these situations, the plaintiff was severely burned
while riding on a Loop-O-Plane. 5 The seat caught fire. The plaintiff
19 None of the cases examined discuss the possible difference in the use of the doctrine of res
ipso foquitur as to whether it is treated as raising a presumption or creating an inference. Since
none of the cases examined on amusement injuries makes the point, no effort will be made here to
discuss the question of evidence presented.
20 Harrison v. Southeastern Fair Ass'n, 104 Ga.App. 596, 122 S.E.2d 330 (1961).
21 Pierce v. Gooding Amusement Co., 90 N.E.2d 585 (Ohio App. 1949). Plaintiff was holding a
baby on a merry-go-round horse. The horse come loose and knocked plaintiff to the ground.
22 In the Pierce case, supra note 21, the court listed three elements as necessary for reliance on
the doctrine of res ipso foquitur: (a) the instrumentality be under the exclusive control and managenent of the defendant; (b) the means of explaining the accident and the availability of the evidence
be accessible only to the defendant; and (c) upon the facts adduced, the accident be of a type
which the jury could find would ordinarily occur only as a result of the defendant's negligence.
It is interesting to note that the court makes no mention of a fourth element usually required in
res ipso loquitur cases; that is, no contribution by the plaintiff to the happening. Prosser, Torts
208 (1955).
23 Harrison v. Southeastern Fair Ass'n, 104 Go.App. 596, 122 S.E.2d 330 (1961).
24 Covey v. State, 200 Misc. 340, 106 N.Y.S.2d 18 (Ct. Cl. 1951).
25 Hicks v. Fontaine Ferry Enterprises, Inc., 247 S.W.2d 493 (Ky. App. 1952).
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relied on res ipsa loquitur. That there was an unusual occurrence
was not questioned; nor was the exclusive control of the device
by the defendant contradicted. However, in spite of expert testimony by witnesses for the plaintiff that the fire could have resulted
from hot oil flowing along the shaft of the device from the engine,
the court directed a verdict for the defendant. The decision was
based on the fact that the plaintiff failed to prove that the accident
more likely than not was'a result of the defendant's negligence.
It seems that with the testimony as to a possible cause of the
fire, the plaintiff had established his case well enough to get to the
jury on res ipsa loquitur. What more could plaintiff do in such a
situation? It is highly likely that such an unusual occurrence would
result only from the negligence of someone. By showing that the
fire was possibly caused by a defective mechanism in the motor,
the plaintiff has tied the negligence closely enough to the defendant.
For this reason, it seems the opinion may be questioned.
In a recent Colorado case 2 6 the plaintiff was denied recovery
for injuries to her back allegedly incurred as a result of the negligent maintenance and operation of a Loop-O-Plane. The evidence
showed that the plaintiff was unable to hold onto a safety bar in
front of her, but this resulted from the natural effect of the forces
produced by the device.2 7 She contended that the accident resulted
from the defendants' failure to securely fasten the seat belt. However, evidence on the insecure fastening of the seat belt was unclear.
In discussing the application of the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur
the court said that it was inapplicable because of:
the insufficiency of the circumstantial evidence to establish
the ingredients of the claim. In order for the doctrine to fill
the breach-it must appear (1) that the instrumentality is
under the exclusive control of the defendant, (2) that the
accident is of a kind which ordinarily does not occur in the
absence of defendant's negligence, (3) that it must not have
been due to any
voluntary act or contribution on the part
28
of the plaintiff.

Plaintiff failed to satisfy (2) and (3) above. The accident was
not a kind to bespeak negligence; and it was explainable in terms
26 Hook v. Lakeside Park Co., 142 Colo. 277,
27 The Loop-O-Plane is a device consisting of
to back-oattoched to a long arm which rotates
clockwise and counterclockwise.
28 Hook v. Lakeside Park Co., 142 Colo. 277,

it

351 P.2d 261 (1960).
a two seated car in which the passengers sit back
in a circle on a vertical plane. It operates both
288, 351 P.2d 261, 268 (1960).

11
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of causes which were not tortious. In fact, "the happening is not
such as to point to negligence as the predominant or even the equal
explanation, and so the vagueness and ambiguousness of plaintiff's
of res ipsa
evidence operates to defeat her claim, and the doctrine
'29
loquitur does not serve to supply the deficiencies.
III. DEFENSES AVAILABLE
The operator of an amusement device has available the defense
of plaintiff's own conduct to defeat liability. The two common defenses, of course, are contributory negligence and assumption of
risk. Mention will later be made of another defense sometimes asserted--contractual limitation.
Turning first to contributory negligence, recovery has often
been denied on this ground. In the cases involving roller coasters,
the conduct of the plaintiff is usually that of failing to properly seat
himself in the car. In one case the plaintiff sat on the arm of the
seat and was thrown off the roller coaster on a curve; this was
held to be contributory negligence. 30 Again, if a patron is riding on
a roller coaster with only one hand on the safety bar and the other
hand around his companion's shoulder, even without knowledge
of the31hazards of the ride this may amount to contributory negligence.
It should be pointed out, however, that the existence of other
factors may still allow recovery by the plaintiff. There may be
evidence of mechanical failure or negligent operation as well as
was
evidence of contributory negligence. In one case the plaintiff
injured as a result of a violent jerk of a roller coaster. 32 The defendant pleaded contributory negligence in that the plaintiff allegedly failed to make proper use of a safety bar. Since there was
credible evidence as to both contentions, the appellate court refused
to disturb the finding that the defendant's negligence was the proximate cause of the injury.
This holding and another 33 illustrate the rule that the question
of contributory negligence is for the jury. In the latter case recovery
by the plaintiff was sustained even though she stepped into the
path of a miniature train which allegedly sounded its whistle. It
was possible that the warning blended into the sounds from the
other concessions and went unheard.
Naturally, the defense of contributory negligence should not
be presented to the jury if the defendant has not introduced evidence to establish it. In a recent case involving injury on a "Shoot
The Chute" device, the trial court gave four contributory negligence
instructions concerning the plaintiff's posture in the device; and
the verdict was for the defendant. 34 This was reversed on appeal
because the defendant had introduced no evidence as to what might
be correct posture or that the plaintiff had been told how to sit.
The court had merely instructed the jury that if it believed the
plaintiff had failed to seat himself correctly, he could not recover.
This was error.
29
30
31
32
33
34

Id. at 289, 351 P.2d at 268.
State ex rel. Hamel v. Glen Echo Park Co., 137 Md. 529, 113 AtI. 85 (1921).
Pointer v. Mountain Ry. Constr. Co., 269 Mo. 104, 189 S.W. 805 (1916).
Sanderson v. Bob's Coaster Corp., 133 Conn. 677, 54 A.2d 270 (1947).
Bates v. Siebrand Bros.Circus & Carnival, 71 Idaho 318, 231 P.2d 747 (1951).
Reynolds v. Phare, 365 P.2d 328 (Wash. 1961).
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Frequently, of course, the defense of contributory negligence
will be of no avail because of the fact the plaintiff is a minor. The
general rule is that a child is bound only to use that degree of care
which ordinarily prudent children of a like age and like intelligence
are accustomed to use under the circumstances. 5 In the case cited
above the child's conduct was such that under the circumstances,
similar conduct on the part of an adult might have constituted contributory negligence, but since the child was nine years old, his
care and foresight were measured by a rule different from that
applicable to an adult.
As the age of the plaintiff increases, however, the degree of
care required of him also approaches that required of an adult, and
recovery may be barred by the plaintiff's own conduct. 36 In an ilten years old, but fully
lustrative case the injured child was only
37
capable of reading a sign of warning.
Turning next to the defense of assumption of risk, often where
such defense is used, it too will be ineffective if the plaintiff is a
child. A child assumes the risk only of dangers the existence of
which he knew, or which in the exercise of a degree of care applicable to8 children of the same age and intelligence, he ought to have
known.1

The classic illustration of the application of the doctrine of
assumption of risk in general was presented by Judge Cardozo in
39
the New York case of Murphy v. Steeplechase Amusement Co.
In that case the plaintiff was thrown from a moving belt device
called "The Flopper," and he suffered a broken knee cap. The
plaintiff's case rested on the negligence of the defendant's operation of the device which produced a sharp or sudden jerk. Judgment
for the plaintiff was reversed.
There was in this case no question of an obscure or unobserved
danger. People were observed to fall; the belt was in constant motion. In such cases where the dangers are obvious to all and, in
fact, are part of the amusement sought, the patron takes the chance
As Judge Cardozo stated: "The timorous
of injury upon himself.
' 40
may stay at home.

The situation of observable dangers is also well illustrated by
a recent case of injury on a Loop-O-Plane ride.4 1 The plaintiff was
denied recovery because she had observed the ride and knew how
it operated. There was no negligence in the operation of the device.
Because the risks of such a ride are natural and obvious, no special
warnings need be given to patrons.
Proceeding from this situation to others less clear, the efficacy
of the defense of assumption of risk may not be great. The general
rule is that a patron assumes the usual risks ordinarily to be encountered but not those risks engendered
42 by negligence in operation
or resulting from defective equipment.
35 Brown v. Rhoades, 126 Me. 186, 137 Atl. 58 (1927).
36 See, for example, the case of a fifteen year old boy climbing on a merry-go-round, Abbot v.
Alabama Power Co., 214 Ala. 281, 107 So. 811 (1926).
37 Ainsworth v. Murphy, 5 La.App. 103 (1926).
38 Brown v. Rhoades, 126 Me. 186, 137 AtI. 58 (1927).
39 250 N.Y. 479, 166 N.E. 173 (1929).
40 Id. at 483, 166 N.E. at 174.
41 Vance v. Obadol, 256 S.W.2d 139 (Tex. Civ. App. 1953). See also Hook v. Lakeside Park Co._
142 Colo. 277, 351 P.2d 261 (1961).
42 Stockweather v. Buck, 277 App.Div. 835, 97 N.Y.S.2d 857 (1950); Beaulieu v. Lincoln Rides.
Inc., 328 Mass. 427, 104 N.E.2d 417 (1952).
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In one New York case the intermediate appellate court held
that a patron on a miniature automobile ride assumed the risk of
even a defective steering wheel, but the decision was reversed on
appeal to 43the court of appeals, and judgment for plaintiff was
reinstated.

Two cases involving rides on a "whip" device 44 illustrate another situation where the defense of assumption of risk may not
be effective. 45 The plaintiffs were injured as a result of being
thrown from the device. In both cases it is indicated that a patron
does not, as a matter of law, assume such a risk by merely riding
on the device. Being thrown out of the car was not part of the game.
Even where the injury is not a result of such a comparatively
unusual accident as being thrown from a device, it is for the jury
to decide if the plaintiff "assumed the risk encountered. 46 In the
cited case the injury was sustained as a result of a sudden jerk on
a roller coaster. In another case where the defendant raised the
defenses of contributory negligence and assumption of risk, recovery
for the plaintiff was sustained in spite of evidence that the plaintiff
was riding backwards without using the safety strap.
The con47
troverted question of fact is for the jury to decide.
However, in yet another case very similar to those just discussed, it was held that the plaintiff had assumed the risks of a
roller coaster ride.48 The lurch of the car which threw the plaintiff
from the coaster was not shown to be unusual.
It is interesting to compare the use of the doctrine of assumption of risk in amusement park cases with its use in a case of an
injury from a sport involving a much greater hazard. In a 1949 New
York case involving an injury suffered on a bobsled run, the lower
court indicated that the plaintiff assumed not only the risk of bobsledding, but also the risk of consequential injuries or damages,
whether or not he could have foreseen them. 49 "It may well be that
known dangers of exposure to cold and the possibilities of delay in
hospitalization were inherent in the risk assumed." 50 The plaintiff
claimed that his injuries were aggravated because of lack of prompt
medical treatment, the use of a pickup truck as an ambulance, and
the failure of the defendant's agents to properly warm him while
transporting him to a hospital. Dismissal of the plaintiff's claim
was affirmed on appeal. 51
Sometimes the tickets used at amusement parks have a statement printed thereon which attempts to limit the liability of the
owner on account of injuries suffered by patrons riding a device.
Although such limitations may lawfully exempt the owner from
liability for negligence in the operation of the device, such limitation must be so communicated to the patron to bring it to his attention. 52 If the ticket has the appearance of a mere check or token

43 Branch v. Bug Ride, Inc., 297 N.Y. 623, 75 N.E.2d 634 (1947).
44 A "Whip" is a device consisting at several small cars which whirl in either direction as the
car proceeds along a winding track.
45 Stockweather v. Buck, 277 App.Div. 835, 97 N.Y.S.2d 857 (1950); Beaulieu v. Lincoln Rides,
Inc., 328 Mass. 427, 104 N.E.2d 417 (1952).
48 Schnoor v. Palisades Realty & Amusement Co., 112 N.J.L.506, 172 Atli. 43 (Ct. Err. & App.
1934). Also see note 16, supra.
47 Moore v. Rosecliff Realty Corp., 88 F.Supp. 956 (D. N.J. 1950).
48 Lumsden v. L.A. Thompson Scenic R.R., 130 App.Div. 209, 114 N.Y.Supp. 421 (1909).
49 Clark v. State, 276 App.Div. 10, 93 N.Y.S.2d 28 (1949).
50 Id. at 13, 93 N.Y.S.2d at 31.
51 Clark v. State, 302 N.Y. 795, 99 N.E.2d 300 (1951).
52 Kushner v. McGinnis, 289 Mass. 326, 194 N.E. 106 (1935).
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and is to be collected by the owner on admission to the ride, the
chances are that the attempted limitation of liability will not be
effective. It must be brought home to the patron in such a manner
that a person of ordinary intelligence would understand it."
IV.

WHO Is LIABLE

Having.established a basis for liability, a claimant has to decide
against whom suit should be brought. The balance of this discussion
will direct attention to this question.
Naturally the owner of an amusement device should be a defendant. His liability flows from a violation of the duty owed by a
proprietor of such device to invitees on his premises. The proprietor
is required to exercise that degree of care to prevent injury to his
invitees which a reasonably prudent person would exercise under
the same circumstances. 54 Failure to do so is negligence.
The courts in the early cases refrained from charging a proprietor of a place of public amusement with a higher duty than
that of reasonable care.5 5 However, he is held to a stricter accounting than the owners of private property in general. This stricter
accounting involves the obligation to know that the premises are
safe for public use.5 6
With the passage of time and the increase in the number of
cases there appears to have been a modification of the ordinary
care standard. In a case of injury suffered on a slide device the
court said that the degree of care required of one operating an
amusement device is higher than ordinary care.5 7 It is care proportionate to the risk involved and the circumstances, and one of the
circumstances is that he invites people to ride on the device,
and by
58
that impliedly holds out that they can do it with safety.
This raising of the degree of care required of operators of
amusement rides is not general, however. Some jurisdictions still
adhere to the prevailing rule that the standard
is a reasonable pre59
caution to avoid injury, or ordinary care.
53
54
55
56
5T

Brennan v. Ocean View Amusement Co., 289 Mass. 587, 194 N.E. 911 (1935).
New Bay Shore Corp. v. Lewis, 193 Va. 400, 69 S.E.2d 320 (1952).
Williams v. Mineral City Park Ass'n, 128 Iowa 32, 102 N.W. 783 (1905).
Smith v. Cumberland County Agricultural Soc'y, 163 N.C. 346, 79 S.E. 632 (1913).
Kehoe v. Central Park Amusement Co., 52 F.2d 916 (3d Cir. 1931).

58 Ibid.

59 See, for example, Hook v. Lakeside Park Co., 142 Colo. 277, 351 P.2d 261
McNally, 324 Mass. 385, 86 N.E.2d 638 (1949).

-"

...

ited
o- are iv th
y to Visitin te
visitteS O the
YoUteo are
5A
AO
-4TES
T.1

OU-

(1960); Jeroma Y.

COMPLETE BANK SERVICES

FOR YOU AND YOUR CLIENTS
SAFE DEPOSIT
TRUST DEPARTMENT
•FULL COMMERCIAL SERVICES

MEMBErtRi
DRates NSLRaN k
EAST COLFAX and

MEMBER

FEDERAL

GILPIN

DEPOSIT I NSURANCE

CORP.

J

DICTA

JULY-AucuST, 1962

The standards just discussed have not applied generally to operators of roller coasters. These devices have been recognized as
sources of great peril, and the proprietors have been held to the
standard of exercising the highest care. 60 It is the same degree of
care required of common carriers.61
That this standard of highest care may be extended to the
owners of devices other than roller coasters is indicated by a recent
case involving injuries suffered when a cable broke on an "airplane
ride."62 In that case the defendant objected to an instruction charging him with the duty to operate the ride with the highest degree
of care of a very prudent person engaged in a like business. On
appeal, the instruction was held to be proper.
In one case the operator attempted to relieve himself of the
liability for injuries suffered- on his amusement device because of
the fact that the plaintiff had received a free ride. 63 The defendant
operator received a directed verdict in the trial court which was
reversed on appeal. The court pointed out that the offer of free
rides was not a pure gratuity but was used to induce people to
patronize the device. Therefore, there was business advantage
enough to the defendant to charge him with ordinary negligence.
In large amusement parks the situation is most likely that the
owner's (operator's) servant, rather than the owner himself, is in
actual physical control of the device. If an injury results from the
intentional act or the negligence of such servant, the servant is
64
liable under elementary tort law.

As indicated in the early part

of this paper the owner also could be joined as a defendant in a
suit for such torts of one of his servants if the act occurred while
the servant was acting within the scope of his authority; liability
of the master is based on the doctrine of respondeat superior. 65
It is beyond the scope of this paper to discuss the agency problems concerned with the determination of whether or not the master-servant relationship exists. General agency law indicates that
there needs to be a contract of employment (express or implied)
between competent parties resulting in the master's direction and
control of the servant's performance of services for compensation.
The determination in a given case is a question of fact.
As a practical matter it would appear that when a servant's
actions are involved, he should be joined as a party so that all of
the parties may be before the court in the first place. Recovery
may, be had against all of them.6 6 Thus, the plaintiff has a greater
opportunity for satisfaction of his judgment. It may very well work
out that the servant has no assets to reach, but he should be joined. 67
In addition to the owner of the amusement device and the
servant, if he is involved, the owner of the premises or land may
60 Sand Springs Park v. Shroder, 82 Okla. 244, 198 Pac. 983 (1921).
61 Best Park & Amusement Co. v. Rollins, 192 Ala. 534, 68 So. 417 (1915); Bibeau v. Fred W.
Pearce Corp., 173 Minn. 331, 217 N.W. 374 (1928).
62 Gromowsky v. Ingusal, 241 S.W.2d 60 (Mo. App. 1951).
63 Beaulieu v. Lincoln Rides, Inc., 328 Mass. 427, 104 N.E.2d 417 (1952).
64 See text, I. Basis of Liability.
65 Annot., 59 A.L.R.2d 1066 (1958).
66 Davidson v. Long Beach Pleasure Pier Co., 99 CaI.App.2d 384, 221 P.2d 1005 (Dist. Ct. App.
1950).
67 There will be no discussion of the effects of insurance in a case. That may influence plaintiff's
choice of procedure, but it does not technically affect liability.
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well be a proper party to join as a defendant. Ordinarily a lessor
is not liable for the injuries sustained by a tenant's invitees on the
leased premises.6 8 However, there has been developed an exception
to this rule which might be called an amusement park exception.
The proprietor of a place of public amusement is required to maintain in a reasonably safe condition all the devices used 69on the premises, and to reasonably inspect and supervise them. The duty
imposed upon the lessor is not discharged because the injury re-°
sulted from the activity of an independent concessionaire or lessee.
The cases generally point out the fact that the lessor or owner
liability,
of the park receives an admission fee from all patrons, and
in consequence, is established from this arrangement.7 1 The same
result is established where the owner receives a rental72 involving
a percentage of the gross receipts of the concessionaire. It seems,
also, that a lessee who subleases premises to73 an independent sublessee will be held liable on the same basis.
The extent of the duty owed by the lessor deserves yet further
emphasis. As indicated by the Restatement of the Law of Torts,
cited above, the lessor's care must extend not only to construction
and installation of safe equipment but also to seeing to its proper
use even if an independent contractor is involved. As stated by the
Pennsylvania Supreme Court: "The important fact is that the
[device] was operated in the park owned and operated by the
[lessor], who invited the public to become patrons of the amusement devices. ' 74 The court went on to point out that the duty owed
was reasonable care in the construction, maintenance, and management of the device.
There are possible grounds by which the lessor or landowner
may escape liability. In the first instance, the landowner may donate the use of the land to the amusement operator. In a Massachusetts case for damages for the death of a child at a charity carnival, the landowner was not held liable even though 75the child was
killed on part of the land not used by the carnival. The benefit
to the landowner of receiving admissions or rental was removed;
and at best the persons attending were in the position of licensees,
and the landowner could not be charged with knowledge that the
use a portion of the land not intended for use by the
child would
76
carnival.

68 Gentry v. Taylor, 182 Tenn. 223, 185 S.W.2d 521 (1945).
69 Davidson v. Long Beach Pleasure Pier Co., 99 CaI.App.2d 384, 221 P.2d 1005 (Dist. Ct. App.
1950); Gibson v. Shelby County Fair Ass'n, 241 Iowa 1349, 44 N.W.2d 362 (1950).
70 Engstrom v. Huntley, 345 Pa. 10, 26 A.2d 461 (1942); Wodnik v. Luna Park Amusement Co.,
69 Wash. 638, 125 Pac. 941 (1912). The former case cites with approval Restatement, Torts §§ 344,
415 (1934). Section 344 reads: "A possessor of land who holds it 0pen to the entry of the public
for his business purposes is subject to liability to members af the public entering for such purposes
for bodily harm caused to them by his failure to exercise a reasonably careful supervision of the
appliances or methods of an independent contractor or concessionaire whom he has employed or
permitted to carry on upon the land an activity which is directly or indirectly connected with his
business use thereof." Section 415 states: "A possessor of land who in the course of his business
holds it open to members of the public, is subiect to liability for bodily harm caused to them, on
a part of the land retained in his possession or upon a part thereof leased to a concessionaire, by
his failure to exercise reasonable care to secure the use of reasonably safe equipment and methods
by an . . . (b) independent contractor or concessionaire employed or permitted to carry on upon
the land an activity in furtherance of the possessor's business use thereof."
71 Stickle v. Riverv.ew Sharpshooters Park Co., 250 III. 452, 95 N.E. 445 (1911); Covey v. State,
200 Misc. 340, 106 N.Y.S.2d 18 (Ct. Cl. 1951).
72 Davidson v. Long Beach Pleasure Pier Co., 99 Cal.App.2d 384, 221 P.2d 1005 (Dist. Ct. App.
1950); Wodnik v. Luna Park Amusement Co., 69 Wash. 638, 125 Pac. 941 (1912).
73 Murphy v. Electric Park Amusement Co., 209 Mo.App. 638, 241 S.W. 651 (1922).
74 Engstrom v. Huntley. 345 Pa. 10, 12, 26 A.2d 461, 463 (1942).
75 Karlowski v. Kissock, 275 Mass. 180, 175 N.E. 500 (1931).
76 Id. at 183, 175 N.E. at 501.
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In the second place where the lessor parts with all control over
the premises he has been held not liable. A recent case illustrates
this. The plaintiff was injured by a defective stool in a lunch room
at an amusement park. It was shown the lessor received no percentage of the receipts, and that the lunchroom was in the exclusive
control of the defendant. 77 It seems that this holding may be criticized because the plaintiff was an invitee of the landlord to the park
grounds. Where so many people are congregated on the landowner's
grounds and he receives admission fees from them, it would appear
that the duty of continuing inspection should run to all the facilities
to apply the amusement
of the park. However, the court declined
78
park exception in the plaintiff's favor.
A third instance of nonliability is provided by another Massachusetts case.79 The plaintiff was injured while riding a "Whip"
device on a "free ride." In the lower court the defendant operator
and defendant park company received directed verdicts. As to the
operator, this was reversed on appeal because the free ride was
an inducement to get people to ride-similar to free samples. Only
some business advantage need be shown to charge the defendant
with negligence. This was not a pure gratuity; some business advantage was here found. However, the court said there was no
evidence that the park company was in any way responsible for
the plaintiff's injury. Outside of this statement no authority was
given to excuse the landowner from liability. Contrary to the outcome, there was evidence that all the rides in the park were free,
and that the free rides were used to induce people to attend. The
resulting benefit extended to the landlord, and the liability attached
to the benefit should have been the park company's burden as well
as the operator's.8 0
In some situations there may yet be another escape from liability, and that is by means of the doctrine of sovereign immunity.
77 Gentry v. Taylor, 182 Tenn. 223, 185 S.W.2d 521 (1945).
78 The court in the Gentry case, ibid., indicated that the liability of the landowner is limited to
these cases: (a) where he has an interest more or less substantial; (b) where he exercises, or has
the right to exercise, some control over the oprntion; (c) where he holds out to the public that he
is interested in the ownership or control to induce patronage; (d) where the lessee operates an
inherently dangerous

dcv ce which creates

a nondelegoole

ducy on the part of the landowner; and

It seems the court could have favored
(e) where a defect existed at the time of the lease.
the plaintiff by applying (a) or (c) above.
79 Beaulieu v. Lincoln Rides, Inc., 328 Mass. 427, 104 N.E.2d 417 (1952).
80 Massachusetts' landlords have been charged with and found liable for the torts of their
independent contractors: Brandolino v. Carrig, 312 Mass. 295, 44 N.E.2d 788 (1942).
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This doctrine, of course, applies to situations in which there is a
governmental unit acting as the landowner or lessor of the park
in question. It is not the purpose here to explore the whole area
to illustrate how it affects liability in
of sovereign immunity, but
the area under discussion.81
Turning first to the situation in which a state is the lessor involved and the state has given its consent to be sued in tort, it may
be liable under the same principles as a private landowner in an
amusement park case.8 2 In a recent New York case the plaintiff
recovered from the state for injuries sustained while she was observing a "scooter ride" in a state park. The state had collected an
admission fee. The court pointed out that the liability for the negligence of the concessionaire falls on an owner who charges a general
state of New York, acting through its
admission, in this case 8 the
3
agriculture department.
Although the doctrine of governmental immunity is falling
into disfavor in some jurisdictions, where it does exist it is applicable to suits against state agencies as well as against the state
itself.8 4 In those jurisdictions 5a recovery for any tort injury would
be precluded by the doctrine.
When one finds a subsidiary governmental unit such as a
county or a municipality running an amusement park, the problem
becomes complicated because of the need to determine whether or
not a governmental function is being performed by the county or
municipality. Under the rules applicable in this field of sovereign
immunity, such sub-units of government occupy a dual positionthey are endowed with strict governmental powers as a branch
of the state government, and yet they are also corporate entities
subject, in a way, to the same requirements as private corporations.8 6 Determining which function is served in the case of a city
maintaining a park with amusement devices therein presents a nice
question.
The early cases seem to show a pronounced split of authority
as to what function a municipality performs in the establishment
and maintenance of public parks in general. Illustrative of the rule
that this is a governmental function is the statement in a Kentucky
case that parks are essentially public places established for public
purposes, and municipal corporations are not liable in tort for
injuries to visitors.8 7 Even when the injuries are inflicted by animals in88a zoo or on playground equipment, such has been the
holding.
However, the contrary view that the city is performing a
proprietary function has much support. 89 This has frequently been
held when the injuries complained of resulted from the failure of
the city to construct or maintain amusement equipment in a reasonably safe manner. An early Colorado case held that if the city via
81 For a resume of the entire area of sovereign immunity refer to Prosser, Torts § 109 (1955).
82 Id. at 773.
83 Covey v. State, 200 Misc. 340, 106 N.Y.S.2d 18 (Ct. C1. 1951).
84 Taylor v. New Jersey Highway Authority, 22 N.J. 454, 126 A.2d 313 (1956).
85 Prosser, Torts 771 (1955).
86 Id. at 774.
ST Park Comm'rs v. Prinz, 127 Ky. 460, 105 S.W. 948 (1907).
88 As to animals, see Hibbard v. Wichita, 98 Kan. 498, 159 Pac. 399 (1916); as to playground
equipment, see Bernstein v. Milwaukee, 158 Wis. 576, 149 N.W. 382 (1914).
89 Carey v. Kansas City, 187 Mo. 715, 86 S.W. 438 (1905).
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its agents was negligent in the maintenance of a merry-go-round
in a public park, the city would be liable if such negligence was the
proximate cause of the injury 9 0
Where the municipality conducts its public parks for revenue,
will be held liable for defective condiit seems clear that the city
tions existing in the park.91
Two cases involving miniature train rides provide interesting
illustrations. In a California case the plaintiff was denied recovery
from the defendant city; the court held that under the facts of the
and
case the city was clearly acting in a governmental capacity
hence was not liable for injuries resulting from negligence 92 The
case makes no mention as to whether the city charged a fee for
rides on the train.
A Michigan case involving similar facts was decided in favor
of the plaintiff who had paid a fare for riding on the train, although she had been charged no admission to the park itself.93
The court in this case very nicely divided the operation of running
the park as governmental from the operation of the train which
was held to be a proprietary function even though the total fares
received from rides did not offset the total operating deficit of the
park. The court noted that although governmental immunity is
lost when a city receives income from one of its functions, that
is not the case where the income is merely incidental to the overall
purpose.9 4 This exception did not apply in this case because the ride
itself did operate at a profit in spite of the loss sustained on the
overall operation of the park.
It would seem that in those cases where the municipality is
operating strictly as a lessor and receives rental from concessionaires the rule applying to state governments would be applied
to the cities. 95 Clearly, the city is acting in a proprietary capacity.
If, however, the city is not operating the park but leases the entire
There are cases
facility to an outsider there may be some doubt.
indicating that either result may be reached. 96
90 Canon City v. Cox, 55 Colo. 264, 133 Pac. 1040 (1913).
91 Cornelisen v. Atlanta, 146 Go. 416, 91 $.E. 415 (1917).
92 Meyer v. City & County of Son Francisco, 9 Cal.App.2d 361, 49 P.2d 893 (Dist. Ct. App. 1935).
93 Matthews v. City of Detroit, 291 Mich. 161, 289 N.W. 115 (1939).
94 Id. at 165, 289 N.W. at 117.
95 See Covey v. State, 200 Misc. 340, 106 N.Y.S.2d 18 (Ct. Cl. 1951).
96 See, for example, Dean v. Board of Trustees, 65 Ohio App. 362, 29 N.E.2d 910 (1940), indi.
cating that the benefit of the rentals would be enough to hold the city liable because it was acting
in a proprietary capacity. For the opposite result in a case involving inuries suffered in a city
recreation hall leased to a private group for a fee, see Ramirez v. Ogden City, 3 Utah 2d 102, 279
P.2d 463 (1955).
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